• Prospectus and preliminary results are available upon request.

  • Early draft available upon request.

How States Enforce Laws and Regulations Under Globalization

  • Working Paper; Draft Available Upon Request.
    Abstract: A foundational body of work has examined how institutions and interests shape domestic taxation, but we know little about the domestic politics of global taxation. I ask when and why a government, in negotiating bilateral tax treaties (BTTs), concedes its right to tax the incomes and capital assets of foreign firms and individuals situated in its territory. My theory features the related roles of government ideology and regime type, which I test by developing a comprehensive dataset on BTT-prescribed taxing rights (the Global Taxing Rights Database). I differentiate two types of tax bases: Entry and Exit. Entry refers to the income and capital assets of foreign firms and individuals arising from long-term investment, services, and employment within the source state. Exit covers outbound payments (dividends, interest, and royalties) and gains from divestment. I argue that democracies and left-leaning governments tend to limit taxing rights on Entry to attract investment and foster growth while maintaining higher taxing rights on Exit to deter capital flight.

  • A short research note introducing the Global Taxing Rights Database. In progress.

  • In Progress.

  • Early draft available upon request.

How States Tax and Extract Mobile Capital

Nationality and Nationalism in Globalization

  • Working Paper; Draft Available Upon Request.
    Abstract: Recent studies suggest that non-material concerns, such as nationalism, rather than material self-interest, drive mass opposition to globalization. However, different dimensions of nationalism—such as national pride and national chauvinism—may have contrasting effects on globalization preferences, and nationalism’s influence could be spurious to material self-interest. I argue that strong national chauvinism, but not strong national pride, predicts opposition to globalization, while a combination of strong national pride and weak chauvinism predicts support for globalization. I test this theory using individual-level survey data spanning 44 countries over two decades. I show that national pride and chauvinism have distinct distributions, with individuals exhibiting strong national pride and weak chauvinism tending to be younger, female, wealthier, and more educated. Regression results indicate that strong national pride combined with weak (strong) chauvinism predicts support for (opposition to) trade, inward foreign direct investment, immigration, and the power of international organizations. Finally, panel and quasi-experimental designs yield mixed evidence on whether short-term changes in nationalism causally affect globalization preferences. In sum, the relationship between nationalism and globalization preferences depends on the specific dimension of nationalism and may be spurious to material self-interest, as individuals with high national pride and low chauvinism are often among globalization's winners.